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DISCUSSION ON "DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE
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TRADE AND OTHER MATTERS"
Hunter R. Clark*
Webster's dictionary defines "diverge" as "to go in different directions
from a common point or from each other; as opposed to converge." The noun
"divergence" is defined as the act or state of diverging or branching off; a going
farther apart; deviation or departure from a norm; difference." The nature of the
divergence between the United States and European Union (EU) has been
described variously. In my own writings, I have observed, "there tends to be
little about which the United States and Europe agree upon these days." Others
have framed the predicament more fancifully. For example, Washington Post
correspondent David Ignatius has likened the overall state of relations between
the United States and Europe to "a marriage that has gotten out of sync," warn-
ing that if the divergence widens, "both sides will soon find themselves on very
unstable ground."
Robert Kagan draws an analogy with romance gone sour in his book Of
Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. "The
danger," he writes, "is that the United States and Europe could become posi-
tively estranged," meaning shrill and indifferent toward one another. (Emphasis
added.) Thomas L. Friedman of The New York Times has gone so far as to
assert that the U.S. is virtually at war with France, declaring, "France is not just
our annoying ally. It is not just our jealous rival. France is becoming our
enemy." A transatlantic public opinion poll published in the September 4, 2003
edition of The Washington Post confirms that, at the very least, Americans and
Europeans have different social and cultural values.
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More so than in the past? Probably. Why? There are any number of
explanations. The Economist, for example, cites demographic trends on one
side of the Atlantic; political developments on the other. In its June 9, 2001,
edition, Economist editors wrote:
The United States is a very different place from Europe, and the
differences will grow. Demographically, Americans are increasingly
Asian and Latino, less inclined when looking "home" to turn to
Europe. Their affection for guns, religion, the death penalty and
genetically modified crops seems strange to Europeans. Just as
baffling to Americans is Europeans' toleration of high taxes, fussy
regulation and indulgent state help for idlers and unfortunates. While
Americans remain individualistic citizens of a nation-state at the
height of its power, Europeans are absorbed in an unprecedented
enterprise of union-building. Good luck to them, Americans may say.
Let them sort out their Balkan backyard.
Broadly speaking, what is it that Americans and Europeans tend to
misunderstand or not like about each other? From the American perspective,
rightly or wrongly, critics tend to view the EU as, among other things,
unappreciative of the American largesse that helped rebuild Europe after World
War II; socialistic in orientation, at the expense of individualism and personal
freedom; disdainfully weak militarily, morally irresponsible, and unwilling to
bear a fair share of the collective defense burden; and a potential competitor on
the world stage, especially on the economic front.
The concern over Europe as a potential competitor is somewhat ironic
since Americans tend to underestimate the extent to which Europe has already
achieved superpower status politically and economically. On the one hand, as
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. points out in his book The Paradox ofAmerican Power: Why
the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, the United States is more
powerful than any nation in recent history and plays the central role in
globalization. On the other hand, as Nye makes clear, the EU is the closest
thing to an equal of the U.S. and thus a potential challenger. Europe's military
capability is comparatively miniscule, but the economy of the EU is roughly
equal to that of the United States. Moreover the EU's population is larger, and
the EU's share of world exports considerably exceeds that of the United States.
In addition, the EU is simultaneously widening and deepening. A 10-
nation expansion to 25 total members is scheduled for 2004. Cyprus and Malta
will join the EU along with eastern European states-Hungary, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-that were
part of the former Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, European leaders are drafting and
debating a new constitution that will modernize and cement their political union.
Bolder ambitions for a broadened world role will likely ensue.
In fact, many Europeans have already developed a strong desire to compete
with the U.S. at the superpower level, or at least diffuse or counter-balance
American military supremacy. At this point in their historical development,
Europeans tend to stress the limits of military power, emphasizing instead the
more enduring influence of what Nye refers to as "soft" power. Exercising soft
power means co-opting rather than coercing others, by setting an example
politically, morally, and economically that they will choose to emulate. In this
regard, Europeans do not believe that American behavior sets a good example
for the rest of the world to follow.
Like many who live outside the United States, Europeans find what has
been called American "exceptionalism" dubious and misguided. Francis
Fukuyama, professor of international political economy at the Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies, described the American
sense of exceptionalism in a September 11, 2002, op ed piece for The Washing-
ton Post. He wrote:
Americans believe in the special legitimacy of their democratic
institutions and indeed believe that they are the embodiment of
universal values that have significance for all mankind. This leads to
an idealistic involvement in world affairs, but also a tendency for
Americans to confuse their national interests with universal ones.
Europeans equate American exceptionalism with imperialism and neo-
colonialism because, in their view, it leads the U.S. to behave the way that
empires do. The U.S. is seen as arrogating to itself an ultimate right to act
unilaterally in regard to essential matters, to go its own way and make its own
rules in the world. Or, as Dimitri K. Simes, president of the Nixon Center in
Washington, D.C., explained in the November/December 2003 issue of Foreign
Affairs, "empires generally expect neighboring states and dependencies to
accept their power and accommodate to it. This often contributes to a sense that
the imperial power itself need not play by the same rules as ordinary states and
that it has unique responsibilities and rights."
Europeans also fear the erosion of their culture and traditions-American
"cultural imperialism"-as an unwelcome consequence of globalization. As for
their political orientation, Europeans in fact seem to be more socialistic, and
secular, than Americans, especially at a time when the U.S. seems to be
experiencing, especially in the south, resurgent Christian fundamentalism.
European resentment of the U.S. often takes the form of personal animosity
toward President Bush. Take, for example, Ignatius's report on demonstrations
against the President's visit to London in the Washington Post's November 21,
2003 edition. Ignatius wrote that his European critics "see in Bush all the things
they don't like about America-arrogance, belligerence, boorishness, self-
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absorption." The article quotes one 23-year-old British protestor's description
of Bush as "ignorant, stupid, war-happy and disgraceful," calling him "just as
bad as dictators in other countries." Later in the piece, a London professor asks
rhetorically, "how does one discuss global politics with the rancher from
Texas?" The professor declares, "frankly, he [Bush] doesn't care much about
what the rest of the world thinks."
European disagreements with America encompass a wide gamut, from
world governance to human rights and the environment. Certain policies strike
Europeans as especially egregious. These include the way in which the U.S. has
allegedly minimized the role of the U.N. and the collective security framework;
American opposition to the International Criminal Court (ICC); U.S. abrogation
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in favor of space-based missile
defense; and U.S. rejection of the Kyoto protocol on global warming.
Europeans are most notoriously at odds with the U.S. over the invasion of
Iraq, objecting to the so-called Bush doctrine, which emphasizes preventive war
and American unilateralism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. From their perspective, the United States was all too willing to bypass
the U.N. on Iraq, and they are suspicious of American motives for the Iraq
invasion.
The President's domestic critics share similar sentiments about the Bush
doctrine. For example, in the November 1, 2003 edition of The Economist,
Harold Hongju Koh, professor of international law at Yale Law School and
former secretary of state for human rights in the Clinton administration, tries to
mollify America's overseas critics by distinguishing what Koh calls "American
national culture" from the policies of the current administration. According to
Koh, "each prong of the Bush doctrine places America in the position of
promoting double standards, one for itself, and another for the rest of the
world." He writes:
People living outside America sometimes suggest that the reason [for
the Bush doctrine] is rooted in the American national culture of
unilateralism, parochialism and an obsession with power. With
respect, let me urge you to see it differently. The Bush doctrine, I
believe, is less a broad manifestation of American national culture
than of shortsighted decisions made by a particularly extreme
American administration.
Meanwhile, the United States and European Union are locked in an array
of WTO disputes that my scholarship has characterized collectively as an
escalating trade war. These include, among other things, disagreements over tax
breaks given to American foreign sales corporations (FSCs); the European
import ban on genetically modified, or biotech, crops, referred to derisively in
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Europe as "Frankenfoods"; and government subsidies to Boeing to finance the
development of a new jet that will compete with Europe's Airbus. A long-
running dispute over the European banana import regime has apparently been
resolved. So has a bitter controversy over U.S. retaliatory tariffs on imported
steel, which the Bush administration has rescinded.
Nevertheless, ongoing friction over trade has led at least one observer to
express concern for the long-term health of the multilateral trading system, the
regime put in place under the GATT rubric after World War II that has since
evolved into the WTO. According to Bernard K. Gordon, professor of political
science emeritus at the University of New Hampshire, the U.S. has embraced
a policy of economic "regionalism" that emphasizes bilateral or regional trade
pacts with smaller states, like the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), over comprehensive trade reform or liberalization in the global
context. In Gordon's view, regionalism poses a long-term threat to the WTO's
relevance and viability.
To Gordon's consternation, however, U.S. trade representative Robert
Zoellick is an ardent regionalist. Apparently, Zoellick regards regional alterna-
tives to the WTO as bargaining chips the U.S. can use to force concessions from
the Europeans in upcoming WTO talks. In an article for the July/August 2003
edition of Foreign Affairs, Gordon quotes a letter Zoellick sent him in late 2001,
outlining the American strategy. Zoellick wrote:
I believe a strategy of trade liberalization on multiple fronts-
globally, regionally, and bilaterally-enhances our leverage and best
promotes open markets. As Europeans have pointed out to me, it
took the completion of NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agree-
ment] and the first APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]
Summit in 1993-94 to persuade the EU to close out the Uruguay
Round. I favor a "competition in liberalization" with the U.S. at the
center of the network.
Gordon, for his part, fears that a rising tide of Asian regionalism will
propel China into the role of a global trade hegemon. This would not only
diminish American stature and influence in Asia, which is crucial to American
interests, but globally, as well. In other words, Gordon's worry is that under a
regionalist regime, China, not the United States, will become the center of the
network to which Zoellick refers.
Others have suggested that divergence between the United States and
Europe is less consequential than on the surface it may seem. As my fellow
panelist Peter K. J. Berz, first secretary for trade, Washington, D.C. delegation
of the European Commission, will point out, the U.S. and EU are engaged
together in commerce worth some $2 billion a day, roughly three-quarters of a
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trillion dollars annually. The total, combined amount in dispute between the
two sides at the WTO represents a relatively miniscule fraction of this amount.
Moreover, mechanisms for consultation, information exchange, and joint
cooperation have been institutionalized at all levels across the entire spectrum
of American-European interests and relations. The WTO dispute settlement
process itself offers a constructive forum for airing and resolving misunder-
standings or grievances. Nations used to go to war over their trade disputes.
These days, they settle them peacefully at the WTO.
To the extent that American-European relations do need to be enhanced or
repaired, the place to start might be with the following realizations. First, there
is convergence between the U.S. and EU in regard to key issues, like the
economic development of the poorer countries. The U.S. wants aid recipient
nations to commit to the rule of law, economic reform, and the eradication of
poverty, as well as equal rights for women. Similarly, the EU has declared its
goal of making "aid and preferential trade arrangements with the [developing]
states dependent on their democratization, including equality for women and
improved management."
Second, as Nye points out, despite their differences, the United States and
Europe are the parts of the world closest to each other in basic values, which are
rooted in the Enlightenment. Nye also points out that nowhere on the planet do
the United States and Europe threaten each other's vital or important interests.
Lastly, the United States and Europe need each other in a world where
terrorists and their state sponsors seek to obtain or develop weapons of mass
destruction. As The Economist has observed:
[The United States and Europe] are, together, not only the main
engine of the world's economy but the main custodian of its liberal
values. They have strong interests in common, and each has addi-
tional interests in persuading the other to be at least partly involved
in less obvious areas of concern: America needs European help in
Asia, Europe needs American help almost everywhere. Why?
Because neither power, not even the United States, is usually strong
enough, on its own, to carry the day. Moreover, experience-
remember Bosnia-shows that one without the other makes little
headway, whereas the two together can be effective.
Ignatius has concluded, "solutions exist, or can be found, for all the
problems that beset the allies, so long as they prepared to work to settle their
differences."
That work should start with each side coming to grips with the other's
anxieties. Americans must recognize the EU, for it is one of the truly remark-
able accomplishments in human history. Because of the EU, the leading
European nations have maintained peace and achieved economic prosperity
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after two world wars that nearly destroyed their continent and civilization
during the first half of the 20th century. The process and beneficial results have
transformed the European thinking. As Robert Kagan explains in Of Paradise
and Power:
Europeans today are not ambitious for power, and certainly not for
military power. Europeans over the past half century have developed
a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international
relations, a perspective that springs directly from their unique histori-
cal experience since the end of World War II. They have rejected the
power politics that brought them such misery over the past century
and more. This is a perspective on power that Americans do not and
cannot share, inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on
their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.
He goes on, "within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of interna-
tional relations have been repealed. Europeans have pursued their new order,
freed from laws and even the mentality of power politics. Europeans have
stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of
perpetual peace." In other words, what Americans might regard as Europe's
unwillingness to share the burdens of maintaining order and democracy in a
troubled world is in fact what Europeans see as their mission to spread peace
and the means by which they realized it. American bellicosity and unilateralism
threaten this sense of mission. The United States, by contrast, remains "stuck
in history," as Kagan sees it, with American strategic thought dominated by
what he calls the "lesson of Munich," the inescapable conclusion that villainy
and aggression must be preempted forcefully.
The Europeans should respond with greater sensitivity to the heroic irony
of America's predicament in the world, and with more appreciation. After all,
as Kagan writes, "the United States has played the critical role in bringing
Europe into [its] Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that
paradise possible." The irony for the U.S. is that it cannot, as Kagan puts it,
"enter the paradise itself." Instead, he asserts, the United States, "mans the
walls but cannot walk through the gate." He concludes, "the United States, with
all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the
ayatollahs, the Kim Jong Ils and the Jiang Zemins, leaving most of the benefits
to others."
My conclusion is that relations between the United States and European
Union would be enhanced if each side accepted what the other has become, and
the role each has played in the other's destiny.
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